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within their sector. Trade is costly and there are both variable and ¯xed costs of exporting.
The paper shows that under some plausible conditions supported by the data, trade between
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A large literature documents dramatic changes in the relative supply of skills and the skill
premium, de¯ned as wage of skilled labor relative to that of unskilled labor, over the last
40 years. Although the relative supply of skills has increased substantially, there has not
been a tendency for the skill premium to decline. Instead, the skill premium has generally
risen, and it has risen more signi¯cantly since 1980 (see, for example, Bound and Johnson
(2000), Katz and Murphy (1992), and Autor et al. (2007)). There have been two main
explanations for this pattern and both imply that the demand for skill must have expended
more substantially than supply. The ¯rst argues that new technologies have been skill biased
(Bound and Johnson (2000), Katz and Murphy (1992), and Acemoglu (1998) and (2002)).
The second explanation is related to globalization. It basically states that increased trade
with less developed countries (LDC) raises the demand for skilled labor.
However, many economists object to the second explanation for several reasons. First, if
trade were responsible for the increase in inequality in the skill abundant US, there should
have been a converse e®ect in the LDCs that have traded with the US. However, many of
the LDCs have also experienced rising inequality after opening to trade (see, for example,
Duryea and Szekely (2000) and Behrman et al. (2000)). Second, the Heckscher, Ohlin,
Vanek (HOV) trade model implies that trade with LDCs should increase the relative price
of skill-intensive goods, which in turn should increase the demand for skills. However, many
empirical studies ¯nd no evidence of an increase in the relative price of skill-intensive goods
(Sachs and Shatz (1994) and Desjounqueres et al. (1999)). Finally, and most importantly,
trade with LDCs has increased substantially, but US trade with LDCs has not changed
enough to explain the large changes in the skill premium that have taken place (Krugman
(1995) and Leamer (1994)).
This paper reconsiders the e®ects of trade on the skill premium by focusing on the
trade between identical countries (North-North trade). It develops a theoretical model,
which is a blend of the models presented by Acemoglu (2002) and Melitz (2003), to show2
that trade, even between similar countries, can increase the skill premium. The model has
two sectors (skill and labor intensive) and two factors of production (skilled and unskilled
labor). Outputs of the two sectors are imperfect substitutes as in Acemoglu (2002), and each
sector is populated by a continuum of ¯rms that produce a di®erent product. We further
assume that the returns to scale in the skill intensive sector are at least as strong as those
in the labor intensive sector. As in Melitz (2003), di®erentiated varieties are produced by
heterogeneous ¯rms and production involves both ¯xed and variable costs. Trade is costly
and there are both variable and ¯xed costs of exporting.
We ¯nd that when productivity levels of ¯rms in the skill-intensive sector (stochastically)
dominate1 those in the labor intensive sector, and the ¯rms in the skill intensive sector are
more exposed to trade than those in the labor intensive sector, then such exposure to trade
increases the skill premium.2 We then investigate the quantitative implications of the model.
We show that moving from autarky to maximum integration can increase the skill premium
by 12 percent. When we calibrate the model with the US data, we ¯nd that increases in
trade can explain up to 12 percent of the increase in the US skill premium between 1965
and 2000.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Since entry into foreign markets is costly,
exposure to trade provides new pro¯t opportunities only to the more productive ¯rms in
each sector. Such pro¯t opportunities also induce entry of more new ¯rms in each sector,
which will further increase demand for both skilled and unskilled labor. The increased
demand for inputs by the more productive ¯rms and the new entrants will increase real
wages. However, since ¯rms in the skill intensive sector are relatively more productive,
use skilled labor more intensively, and are relatively more open, the potential returns from
export markets will be higher. As a result, the demand for skilled labor will be higher than
1More precisely, we assume that productivity distribution in each sector follows a Pareto distribution,
and the productivity distribution in the skill intensive sector ¯rst-order stochastically dominates that in the
labor intensive sector (see the discussion in section 3).
2The underlying assumptions are consistent with a host of stylized facts about ¯rms and trade. We
discuss them in detail in section 4.3
that for unskilled labor, which in turn raises the skill premium.
This is not the ¯rst paper that explores the e®ects of trade between similar countries
on the skill premium. For example, Dinopolous et al. (2001) present a monopolistic com-
petition model that highlights the role of intra-industry trade on wage inequality. Their
model assumes quasi-homothetic preferences, non-homothetic production, and endogenous
factor supplies for skilled and unskilled labor. Moving from autarky to free inter-industry
trade causes an expansion of ¯rm size, and hence, an increase in the skill premium. In our
model, preferences and production are homothetic and we have two sectors as opposed to
one. The key ingredient in our model is that ¯rms are heterogenous and the skill inten-
sive sector is relatively more productive than the labor intensive sector. Exposure to trade
asymmetrically a®ects demand for each factor. Neary (2002), on the other hand, presents
an oligopolistic model in which a reduction in import barriers induces incumbent ¯rms to
invest more strategically. This strategic investment increases the demand for skilled labor,
and hence, the skill premium. In our model, however, there are no strategic interactions,
and ¯rms compete monopolistically. Finally, Matsuyama (2007) argues that international
trade inherently requires a more intensive use of skilled labor; as a result, exposure to trade
increases the demand for skilled labor, and hence, the skill premium. In our model, how-
ever, production technologies of goods are the same regardless of whether the goods are
produced for domestic or foreign markets.3 The exception in this literature is Epifani and
Gancia (2007), who also consider a two-sector model similar to ours. They mainly show
that stronger returns to scale in the skill intensive sector imply that any increase in the
volume of trade tends to be skill-biased.
The main di®erence between this paper and Epifani and Gancia (2007) is that our model
incorporates ¯rms heterogeneity and ¯xed sunk costs of entry into foreign markets.4 But
3Moreover, the framework used in both papers are di®erent. Matsuyama uses the Ricardian model of
trade with a continuum of goods, while we consider a two-sector monopolistic competition model with both
¯xed and variable trade costs as in Melitz (2003).
4There is now a large empirical literature that documents substantial variation in productivity across
¯rms, even narrowly de¯ned industries, and substantial sunk costs of entry into foreign markets. See, for
example, Bernard et al. (2007) for a review of this literature.4
this extension has three important consequences. First, their models yield that exposure to
trade always increases the skill premium, whereas we show that theoretically it is possible
that exposure to trade can reduce the skill premium, even if both sectors are exposed to
the trade to the same degree. This basically stems from the existence of sunk costs of entry
into foreign markets. Second, their results crucially hinge on the assumption that returns to
scale in the skill intensive sector are stronger than that in the labor intensive sector. This
implies that the elasticity of substitution between products of the skill-intensive sector is
smaller than that of the labor intensive sector. In our model, however, we show that even
if these elasticities are the same, trade can still have a positive impact on the skill premium
(provided that other conditions are also satis¯ed). Finally, when ¯rms are heterogeneous
and trade has ¯xed costs, only more productive ¯rms will be able to enter export markets,
and, hence, the volume of trade would be lower when compared to that in Epifani and
Gancia (2007). As a result, the e®ect of trade on the skill premium will be lower. Indeed,
our quantitative analysis yields a considerably lower impact than theirs.
The plan of this paper is as follows: section 2 introduces a closed economy model; section
3 opens the economy to trade and investigates the implications of exposure to trade on the
skill premium; section 4 investigates the quantitative implications of the model; and section
5 concludes the paper.
2 The Closed Economy Model
We begin with a description of consumer behavior. We assume that there is a representative
agent whose utility is given by U = Q; where Q is a homogenous ¯nal good which is assem-














where Qj represents the aggregate good of sector j and " is the elasticity of substitution
between output of the two sectors. We assume that " > 1: We further assume that Qs and5








where we assume that 0 < ½j < 1 so that the elasticity of substitution between any two
brands of each sector is given by ¾j = 1=(1 ¡ ½j) > 1: We further assume that ¾u > ¾s >
" > 1 (see section 4 for justi¯cation of this assumption).5 This is a weaker assumption than
that in Epifani and Gancia (2007) who assume that ¾u > ¾s > " > 1:
Let Ps and Pu denote the prices of aggregate goods Qs and Qu: Since Qs and Qu are










Given Pj and Qj; it is easy to show that the optimal quantity and expenditure levels for












where pj(i) is the price of that brand i and Rj = PjQj =
R
rj(i)di is the aggregate expen-
diture on di®erentiated goods. Moreover, competition in the supply of goods qj(i) ensures








Di®erentiated goods are produced by a continuum of monopolists, each choosing to
produce a di®erent variety. We assume that skilled and unskilled labor are the only factors
of production and to simplify the exposition, we further assume that ¯rms in the skill
(labor) intensive sector use only skilled (unskilled) labor, which is inelastically supplied at
5The scale elasticity in this context is measured by ¾j=(¾j ¡ 1): Thus, this assumption implies that the
returns to scale in the skill intensive industry are at least as strong as those in the labor intensive industry.6
its aggregate level Ls (Lu).6 Production has both ¯xed and variable costs in each period: to
produce qj units of output in sector j; fj + qj=' units of type j-labor must be used, where
fj is a ¯xed overhead cost. Thus, as in Melitz (2003), all ¯rms in sector j share the same
¯xed cost wjf but have di®erent productivity levels, which remain constant during their
lifetime, indexed by ' > 0: Regardless of its productivity level, each ¯rm faces a demand





where wj is the wage of j-type worker.
Given this pricing rule, then ¯rm pro¯t is
¼j(') = rj(') ¡ wjqj=' ¡ wjfj = rj(')=¾j ¡ wjfj; (2.7)
where rj(') is ¯rm revenue. Using this pricing rule in (2.4) and (2.7):
qj(') = Qj(Pj½j')¾j;
rj(') = Rj(Pj½j')¾j¡1; ¼j(') =
Rj
¾j
(Pj½j')¾j¡1 ¡ wjfj: (2.8)

















Hence, a more productive ¯rm will have a lower price, will produce more output, and will
earn a higher pro¯t than a less productive ¯rm.
To produce in sector j; ¯rms ¯rst must make an initial investment of fje > 0 units of
type j-labor, which is thereafter sunk. Firms then draw their initial productivity parameter
' from a common distribution gj(¢), which is assumed to be common for ¯rms in sector j:
6Acemoglu (1998), (2002), and (2003) also makes the same assumption about factor intensity, when he
analyzes changes in the skill-premium in the US. Results qualitatively will remain the same, even if both
factors are used in production as long as the skill intensive sector uses skilled labor more intensively than
the labor intensive sector. Analysis, however, will be more complicated (see Appendix A.1).7
After entry, ¯rms then face a constant probability ± in every period of a bad shock that
















where the second equality follows from the fact that each ¯rm's productivity level remains
constant during its lifetime; hence, its optimal per period pro¯t will also remain constant.
Later in our analysis, we make two further assumptions. First, we assume that produc-
tivity levels in the skill intensive sector stochastically dominate those in the labor intensive
sector. Second, we use a speci¯c parametrization for the distributions. Following Cabral
and Mata (2003), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), and many others, we assume that produc-
tivity draws follow a Pareto distribution. Many studies, e.g. Cabral and Mata (2003), ¯nd
that the distribution of ¯rm sizes in the US closely follow a Pareto distribution. However,
since most of our analysis does not hinge on these assumptions, we postpone our discussion
about them until the end of next section.
A ¯rm having productivity ' produces in sector j; if ¼j(') ¸ 0: Since ¼j(') is an
increasing and continuous function of '; there is a su±ciently small ' where ¼j(') < 0:
Then there exists a unique cuto® level 'j such that ¼j('j) = 0:
Notice that the ex-ante probability of having productivity level ' is gj(')d' and the ex-
ante probability of successful entry is 1¡Gj('j); where Gj(') is the cumulative distribution
function for gj('): These together imply that the ex-post distribution of ¯rm productivity,




1¡Gj('j) if ' > 'j
0 otherwise
(2.10)












j pj(~ 'j); (2.11)
where










As argued by Melitz (2003), ~ 'j also represents aggregate productivity because it com-
pletely summarizes the information in the distribution of productivity levels ¹j(') relevant
for all aggregate variables. Furthermore, by using (2.9) in (2.3) and (2.6) it is straightfor-




j qj(~ 'j); Rj = Njrj(~ 'j); and ¦j = Nj¼j(~ 'j); (2.13)
which imply that rj(~ 'j) ´ ¹ rj and ¼j(~ 'j) ´ ¹ ¼j are, respectively, average revenue and average














where the ¯rst equation simply follows from (2.9). Since at the cuto® level the pro¯t is
zero, which implies that rj('j) = ¾jwjfj; average pro¯t ¹ ¼j will be:








Since the ex-ante probability of successful entry is 1¡Gj('j); in any equilibrium where
entry is unrestricted, the net value of entry must be zero:
1 ¡ Gj('j)
±
¹ ¼j = wjfje: (2.15)
Combining this free-entry condition with (2.14) yields:











It is easy to see that Hj(') is strictly decreasing in ':7 Thus, it has a unique solution.
What will be the equilibrium number of products in each sector? As in Melitz (2003),
we shall only consider stationary equilibrium, which implies that the aggregate variables
remain constant over the time. Thus, if Nje is the number of entrants, then the number of
successful entrants should be equal to the number of incumbents who are hit with the bad
shock and exit, i.e. [1 ¡ Gj('j)]Nje = ±Nj: The total labor used by the new entrants is
Lje = Njefje = ±Njfje=[1 ¡ Gj('j)]. Combining with the free-entry condition:
Lje = Nj¹ ¼j=wj ) ¦j = wjLje ) Rj = ¦j + wjLjp = wjLj;
where Ljp denotes total amount of labor used in production in sector j: Since Rj = Nj¹ rj







´¾j¡1; for j = s;u: (2.17)
To derive the skill premium, we ¯rst consider equation (2.3). Multiplying both sides by




































As in Epifani and Gancia (2007), let us de¯ne L = Ls + Lu and Ls = µL: Then from the
above equation, we have the following:



















where ° is the constant de¯ned in equation (2.18).
7dHj(')=d' = (1 ¡ ¾j)[Hj(') + 1 ¡ Gj(')]=' < 0; since ¾j > 1:10
This expression states that changes in the skill premium can be decomposed into three
components: change in the relative cuto® levels (the second term on the right hand side),
change in the scale of economy (the third term), and change in the composition of relative
supply of skills (the last term). Two points should be emphasized. First, note that when
¾u > ¾s > " > 1; it is easy to see that the skill premium is positively related to the relative
cuto® levels, 's='u; and the size of the economy (i.e., total labor supply L). On the other
hand, the skill premium is negatively related to the relative supply of skills, i.e. d!=dµ < 0:
Thus, if there is an increase in the relative cuto® levels or in the size of the economy, the
skill premium will rise. If, on the hand, the relative supply of skills rises, then it will fall.
The ¯nal e®ect depends on the strength of these opposite e®ects. Second, if we assume
that ¾s = ¾u; then the relative cuto® e®ect still works and the market size e®ect disappears
unlike Epigani and Gancia (2007).
3 The Open Economy Model
We now consider the impact of trade in intermediate goods in a world that is composed of
two countries of the kind just analyzed. The basic set-up remains the same as in the closed
economy case. However, ¯rms wishing to export must pay per-unit and ¯xed costs of trade
as in Melitz (2003). Per-unit costs (such as transport and tari®s) do not depend on ¯rm
productivity, and they are modelled in the standard iceberg formulation: in sector j; ¿j > 1
units of a good must be shipped in order for one unit to arrive at its destination.
In addition to the iceberg transportation cost, ¯rms in each sector face a ¯xed investment
cost of wjFjx > 0 that does not depend on the ¯rm's characteristics, such as the productivity
level. Existence of such sunk market entry costs have been well documented by econometric
studies (see, for example, Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Bernard and Jensen (2004)). The
foreign market entry cost covers the cost of modifying the product to meet the foreign market
speci¯cations and, more importantly, covers the regulation costs imposed by governments
to erect non-tari® barriers to trade. The investment decision abroad occurs after the ¯rm's11
productivity is revealed. Since ¯rms face a constant probability of death in each period and
there is no uncertainty in the export market, then the one time investment cost wjFjx will
equal paying wj±Fjx in every period. Hereafter we assume that as if ¯rms pay wjfjx in
each period with fjx = ±Fjx: This adaptation makes the following analysis more tractable
and notationally simple (Melitz (2003)), without a®ecting any results. Regardless of export
status, a ¯rm still incurs the same overhead production cost fj: Because countries are
symmetric, they have the same prices for aggregate goods and the same number of ¯rms in
each sector.
Each ¯rm's price in its domestic market is still given by pjd(') = wj=½j': Firms who
export, however, will charge higher prices in the foreign markets: pjx(') = ¿jwj=½j' =
¿jpjd('): This basically re°ects the increased marginal cost ¿j of serving the foreign market.
Revenues earned from domestic sales and export sales are, respectively, rjd(') and rjx(') =
¿1¡¾
j rjd('): The combined revenue of a ¯rm, rj('), is then given by:
rj(') =
½
rjd(') if the ¯rm does not export
rjd(') + rjx(') if the ¯rm exports
(3.1)
The pro¯t of ¯rms who export now can be separated into two parts: pro¯ts earned from








Each ¯rm's combined per-period pro¯t can be written as ¼j(') = ¼jd(')+maxf0;¼jx(')g.
Similar to the closed economy case, ¯rm value is given by ºj(') = maxf0;¼j(')=±g. Now
there are two cuto® productivity levels, 'jd for successful entry into domestic market and 'jx
for successful entry into export market: ¼jd('jd) = 0 and ¼jx('jx) = 0. Note that at 'jx,
¼jd('jx) > 0 , rjd('jx) > ¾jwjfj: From the export cuto® condition rjx('jx) = ¾jwjfjx.
But then ¿
1¡¾j
j rjd('jx) = ¾jwjfjx, which, in turn, implies that ¿
¾j¡1
j fjx > fj: To ensure
partitioning of ¯rms, we assume that this condition holds.
The equilibrium distribution of productivity levels for incumbent ¯rms is still given
by ¹j(') = gj(')=[1 ¡ Gj('jd)] for 8' ¸ 'jd: The ex-ante probability of successful entry12
into export market will be given by ³jx = [1 ¡ Gj('jx)]=[1 ¡ Gj('jd)]: Let Nj denote the
equilibrium mass of incumbent ¯rms in sector j of any country. Njx = ³jxNj then represents
the mass of exporting ¯rms.
Total revenue and total pro¯t in sector j are now given by
Rj = Nj[rjd(~ 'jd) + ³jxrjx(~ 'jx)] and ¦j = Nj[¼jd(~ 'jd) + ³jx¼jx(~ 'jx)];
where ~ 'jd = ~ 'j('jd) and ~ 'jx = ~ 'j('jx) denote the average productivity levels of all ¯rms
and exporting ¯rms only, respectively (see equation (2.12)). These equations ensure that
the average revenue ¹ rj = Rj=Nj and the average pro¯t ¹ ¼j = ¦j=Nj are now given by
¹ rj = rjd(~ 'jd) + ³jxrjx(~ 'jx) and ¹ ¼j = ¼jd(~ 'jd) + ³jx¼jx(~ 'jx): (3.3)
To determine the cuto® levels 'jd and 'jx; we need two equations. First, the zero cuto®





















Second, notice that (2.10) and (3.2) together with the zero cuto® pro¯t conditions yield
that:















Now using (3.4), the average pro¯t can be expressed as a function of the cuto® levels
'jd and 'jx :















As in the closed economy, ¹ ¼j=± is the present value of the average pro¯t °ows and













where Hj is de¯ned in (2.16). Equations (3.4) and (3.7) constitute a system of two equa-
tions with two unknowns 'jd and 'jx: We have already shown that Hj(') is a monotone-
decreasing function. Moreover, since according to (3.4) 'jx is an increasing function of
'jd; equation (3.7) together with (3.4) yields a unique solution for ('jd;'jx): Furthermore,
notice that the right hand sides of (2.16) and (3.7) are identical. For each '; the left hand
side of (3.7), however, is greater than that of (2.16), which implies that 'jd > 'j:
The intuition behind this result is simple. Since ¯rms face a ¯xed (foreign market)
entry cost, only more productive ¯rms can a®ord to cover such cost. Therefore exposure
to trade provides new pro¯t opportunities only to the more productive ¯rms. Furthermore,
such pro¯t opportunities also induce more new entry. The increased demand for inputs by
the more productive ¯rms and the new entrants bid up the real wages and force the least
productive ¯rms to exit (for more details, see Melitz (2003)).
Following the same steps as in the closed economy, we obtain the following result (see
appendix A.2 for details).



















where ° is the constant de¯ned in equation (2.18).








where !o and !a stand for the skill premia in the open economy and the autarky. Thus,
if the ¯rst term on the right hand side is greater than 1, then exposure to trade raises the
skill premium.
We now turn to the parametrization of the distribution function. We assume that
productivity draws follow a Pareto distribution:





; j = s;u; (3.10)
where kj is the shape parameter and bj is the scale parameter that bounds the support
[bj;+1) from below. This distribution has ¯nite a variance if and only if kj > 2: We
assume that kj + 1 > ¾j; which ensures that the integrals in aggregate variables converge.
This speci¯c distribution form together with (2.16), (3.4), and (3.7) ensures that
'jd = (1 + ­j)
1










Notice that 0 6 ­j 6 18 and when ¿j and/or Tj decrease, ­j increases. Thus, ­ measures
the degree of openness: a higher value of ­j corresponds to a more open economy. Using
the ¯rst equation in (3.11) in (3.9), the following results are easily follow.
Corollary 1. Suppose that the productivity draws in sector j follow the Pareto distribution
described in (3.10). Then we have













8There is a simple way to see this. It is easy to show that the share of total trade (export plus import)
in output is given by (EXj + IMj)=PjQj = 2­j=(1 + ­j): Since this share must be less than or equal to
one, we have ­j · 1:15
where !o and !a represent the skill premia in the open economy and the autarky, kj
is the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution, and ­j is the measure of openness
de¯ned as in (3.11).
ii. If ks 6 ku and ­s > ­u (assuming that one of these holds with strict inequality)
then the skill premium in the open economy is greater than that in the autarky, i.e.
exposure to trade rises the skill premium.
iii. Let ks 6 ku and ­s > ­u (assuming that one of these holds with strict inequality).
Suppose that after opening to trade, the economy is further exposed to trade and let
­0
j represent the new equilibrium value of ­j: If ­0
s=­s > ­0
u=­u; then such further
exposure to trade rises the skill premium.
Parts (ii) and (iii) of this corollary present su±cient conditions that make exposure and
further exposure to trade have positive e®ects on the skill premium. If these conditions are
not satis¯ed, then the e®ects of trade can be negative or ambiguous. For example, ks = ku
and ¾u > ¾s imply that when both sectors are exposed to trade at the same degrees (i.e.
¿s = ¿u and Ts = Tu), then such exposure will actually reduce the skill premium. If, on
the other hand, ks 6 ku; ¿s = ¿u; and Ts = Tu; then e®ect of trade on the skill premium
is ambiguous. These results are di®erent than that in Epifani and Gancia (2007) who ¯nd
that exposure to trade always increases the skill premium. The main reason stems from the
¯rm heterogeneity and foreign market entry costs.
4 Quantitative Analysis
In the previous sections we developed a theoretical model and identi¯ed conditions under
which exposure to trade raises the skill premium. In this section, we confront the model
with data to investigate whether these conditions are satis¯ed in practice. Then we study
their quantitative implications.
We ¯rst need to calibrate the parameters "; ¾l; and ¾s: Note that " also measures the16
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor,9 and there is a large labor-
economics literature that focuses on its estimate. The most in°uential study is by Katz
and Murphy (1992), whose estimate, based on the CPS data over the period 1963-1987, is
about 1.4. Autor et al. (2007) extend the period to 2005, and they ¯nd that it is about 1.6.
Using a state-level panel data, Ciccone and Peri (2005) ¯nd that the long-run elasticity of
substitution between more and less educated workers to be around 1.5. Indeed, based on
the various econometric estimates, Autor et al. (1998) conclude that this elasticity is very
unlikely to be greater than 2. In our quantitative analysis, we consider two possibilities:
" = 1:5 and 2:
How about ¾s and ¾u? Based on the previous empirical studies,10 Epifani and Gancia
(2007) provide substantial evidence that ¾u > ¾s: For example, using international trade
data for 71 countries, Antweiler and Tre°er (2002) ¯nd that the average scale elasticity of
the skill intensive sectors (e.g. Petroleum Re¯neries and Coal Products, Pharmaceuticals,
Equipment and Machinery, and Electronic) is around 1.2, while that of the labor intensive
sectors (e.g. Food, Apparel, and Leather) are characterized by constant returns.11 In our
empirical analysis, we consider ¾s = 3:5 (consistent with Bernard et al. (2003) and Morrison
and Siegel (1999)) and ¾s = 6:0; and, as in Epifani and Gancia (2007), ¾u = 1 (consistent
with Antweiler and Tre°er (2002)). Setting ¾u = 1 provides a benchmark case in which
there will be no trade in the labor intensive sector, and hence, the results related to each
speci¯cation represent the maximum e®ect of trade on the skill premium.
We now turn to evaluate the su±ciency conditions in corollary 1. How reasonable to
assume that ks · ku? Unfortunately, there are no industry-level empirical studies that
9To see this, note that wjLj = Rj = PjQj implies that Qj = AjLj; where Aj = ½j ~ 'jN
1=(¾j¡1)
j represents










Clearly " represents the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor.
10See, for example, Morrison and Siegel (1999), Diewert and Fox (2004), and Antweiler and Trefelr (2002).
11Since the scale elasticity is measured by ¾j=(¾j ¡ 1); a scale elasticity of 1.2 implies that ¾s = 6; and a
scale elasticity of 1 (constant returns) implies ¾u = 1:17
estimate k: However, there two good reasons to believe that ks 6 ku: First, as stated by
Melitz (2003), higher productivity levels in this model may also be thought of as producing
a higher quality variety at equal marginal cost. Given that the skill intensive sectors often
have more R&D investment,12 it is reasonable to expect that product qualities in the skill
intensive sector are better than those in the labor intensive sectors. This further implies
that productivity levels in the skill intensive sector are, on average, higher than those in
the labor intensive sectors.13 The relative productivity di®erences can be captured when
the productivity distribution of the skill intensive sector ¯rst-order stochastically dominates
that of the labor intensive sector. Since the productivity draws follow a Pareto distribution,
then the ¯rst-order stochastic dominance implies that bs > bu and ks 6 ku:14
Second, recall that our theoretical model requires that kj +1 > ¾j: Using US plant and
macro data, Bernard et al. (2003) ¯nd that the elasticity of substitution between any two
products is about 3.8. Combined with the standard deviation of log US plant domestic
sales reported by Bernard et al. (2003), this elasticity implies that the corresponding shape
parameter is about 3.4 (see, for example, Ghirno and Melitz (2005) and Demidova (2006)).15
12The data also con¯rms this. Using the OECD Business R&D database (1998a), we ¯nd that the average
R&D intensity (R&D expenditure divided by the value-added) of skill-intensive industries (such as Chemical
Products, Non-Electrical Machinery, Electrical Machinery, and Transport Equipments) are several times
higher than that of low-skill intensive sectors (such as Food, Textile & Apparel, Wood & Furniture, and
Paper). Of course, some of the R&D investment may be related to the new product development. However,
there is a large growth literature that documents that substantial amount of R&D activities is about quality
improvement.
13Alternatively, using OECD STAN (1998c) database, we also calculated the total factor productivity
(TFP) levels at two- to three-digit ISIC, and found that the average TFP of high-skill intensive industries
(such as Non-Electrical machinery, Electrical Machinery, and Transport Equipments) is about 40{90 percent
higher than that of the low-skill intensive industries (such as Food, Textile & Apparel, Wood & Furniture,
and Paper) in G5 countries between 1985 to 1996. TFP is calculated as Y=L
®K
1¡®; where K represents
capital stock. However, we should also stress that such di®erences in TFP levels of the two sectors may also
re°ect the di®erences in human capital and other factors which are not captured by the model.
14To see this, ¯rst recall that Gs ¯rst-order stochastically dominates Gu(¢) if and only if 1 ¡ Gs(') >
1 ¡ Gu(') for each ': Suppose that bu > bs: Then for ' = bu; 1 ¡ Gs(bu) ¸ 1 ¡ Gu(bu) ) (bs=bu)
ks >
1 ) bs > bu; a contradiction with our supposition. Thus, bs > bu: To show that ks 6 ku; note that





ks¡ku; for all ': Since bj and kj are constants, the left-hand side
of this inequality is constant. If ks > ku; then for su±ciently large values of '; the right-hand side will be
greater. Thus, ks 6 ku:
15The theoretical model yields that the standard deviation of log domestic sales equals (¾¡1)=k: Equating
this to 0.84 and setting ¾ = 3:8 implies k = 3:4:18
Since the elasticity (and hence, the shape) parameter was calibrated from the pooled data,
it represents the (weighted) average of ¾s and ¾u (ks and ku), and note that this shape
parameter, based on the above empirical evidence, is closer to ¾s: This together with the
facts that ¾u > ¾s and kj +1 > ¾j suggest that ks · ku: In our analysis, we shall set ks = 3
and ks = 6 (consistent with ¾s = 3:5 and 6, respectively); and ku = 1 (consistent with
¾u = 1).
We now consider the conditions related to ­j which measures the combined e®ects of
variable and ¯xed costs of trade. In principle, there are two ways to evaluate whether
­s > ­u: The ¯rst way explores the the ratio of total trade (export plus import) to the









where sj = (EXj + IMj)=PjQj: Using the data on total trade between the US and the
OECD countries,16 we ¯nd that the total trade shares of the skill intensive industries (such
as chemical and petroleum, industrial machinery, electronic, and transportation) are sub-
stantially higher than that of the labor intensive industries (such as food, textile, apparel,
leather, and paper) in all available years. For example, in 2000, the average trade share of
the skill intensive industries is 41 percent, while it is about 12 percent in labor intensive
industries. This implies that ­s > ­u:17
The second way directly explores trade costs. In a recent work, Bernard et al. (2006)
compile a data set about trade costs. Table 1 in their study summarizes average ad valorem
tari®, freight, and total trade costs across two-digit SIC industries for 1982, 1987, and
16To be consistent with our theoretical exploration, here we only consider the trade between US and the
OECD countries. In calculating trade share, we also corrected total output by subtracting the total trade
to other countries. In calculations, we used OECD bilateral trade database (1998b) and (2007), which cover
from 1970 to 2000.
17One point must be emphasized. The trade share of the skill intensive industries can be higher for some
other reasons that are outside of the scope of the model presented here. For example, the substantially
higher export share of the skill intensive industries relative to other industries may also re°ect the fact that
most labor intensive jobs have been outsourced to export processing developing countries.19
1992.18 According to this table, the total trade cost in the labor intensive industries (such
as food, textile, apparel, leather, and stone) is substantially higher than those in the skill
intensive industries (such as chemical and petroleum, industrial machinery, electronic, and
transportation). In 1982, for example, the total costs (tari®s plus freight rates) in the labor
intensive industries are around 17 percent, while they are around 9% percent in the skill
intensive industries. The pattern remains similar in other years (see the last three columns
in Table 1).19 Since the total costs only cover variable trade costs, these results suggest that
¿s < ¿u: Comparison of ­s to ­u also requires the data on Ts and Tu: Unfortunately, there
is no empirical study that measures industrial-level non-tari® barriers (NBT). However,
given that governments want to protect the labor intensive jobs, it is reasonable to expect
that NBTs in the labor intensive industries are substantially higher than those in the skill
intensive industries. Combined with higher variable trade costs, this suggests that ­u < ­s:
In investigating quantitative implications of our model we will use equation (3.12).
Setting ku ! 1 (which corresponds with ¾u ! 1) as the benchmark case, we can derive
the e®ect of trade on the skill premium. Table 1 represents the results for di®erent parameter
values and ­s = 1 represents the maximum integration. The table shows that moving from
autarky to maximum integration can raise the skill premium by up to 12 percent. These
results are substantially lower than that reported in Epifani and Gancia (2007), who ¯nd
that full integration can raise the skill premium up to 32 percent. The main di®erences
in the size of the e®ect come from ¯rm heterogeneity and the sunk entry cost of foreign
markets.
It will be interesting to calculate how much trade has contributed to increases in the
18The costs for each year are the average of ¯ve-year proceeding the year; i.e. the costs for 1982, for
example, are the average of costs from 1977 to 81.
19It must be noted that this trade cost measure is constructed only from US import data. The above
theoretical analysis threats countries symmetric and assumes that they implement the same policy. US trade
policy or inbound transportation rates can be di®erent from those in other countries; as a result, trade costs
may over or underestimate the costs implemented by other countries. However, using a database compiled
by United Nations (UNCTD), Bernard et al. (2006) ¯nd that the correlation of the U.S. and the E.U. ad
valorem tari® rate changes across SIC4 industries is positive and signi¯cant at 1 percent level. This suggests
that inward and outward tari®s are moving in the same directions.20
skill-premium over the last several decades. In 1965, the total trade share in the skill
intensive industry20 was about 10%, which implies that ­s = 0:05: In 2000, however, the
total trade share was about 41%, which implies that ­s = 0:260: For ks = 3 and " = 2;
these measures imply about a 3% increase in the skill premium. Given that there has been
about a 25 percent increase in the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor (e.g. Autor
(2007)), this further implies that the trade between US and OECD countries can explain
up to about 12% increase in the US skill-premium. With " = 1:5; this contribution drops
to 8%.
Table 1: Increase in the Skill Premium (%)
ks = 3 ks = 6
­s " = 2 " = 1:5 " = 2 " = 1:5
0.25 3.8 2.5 1.9 1.2
0.50 7.0 4.6 3.4 2.3
0.75 9.8 6.4 4.8 3.2
1.00 12.2 8.0 5.9 3.9
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study the e®ects of intra-industry trade between similar countries on
the skill premium. We develop a two-sector model in which outputs of the two sectors
are imperfect substitutes, and each sector contains a large number of heterogeneous ¯rms
specialized to produce di®erentiated goods. We show that under some plausible conditions
supported by the data, trade between similar countries can increase the skill premium.
In particular, we ¯nd that when the productivity distribution of ¯rms in the skill intensive
sector dominates that in the labor intensive sector, and the skill intensive sector is relatively
more open to trade than the labor intensive sector, the exposure to trade increases the wage
inequality between skilled and unskilled labor. Our quantitative analysis shows that moving
20The trade data goes back to 1970 and we estimated the trade share in 1965 by using the time trend
between 1970 and 2000.21
from autarky to maximum integration can increase the skill premium by 12 percent. When
the model is calibrated with the US data, we ¯nd that increases in trade can explain up to
12 percent of increases in the skill premium.
Although ¯rms in the model are forward looking, there is no technical change, and hence,
no growth in the model. In an earlier version of this paper, we extended the model to a
product innovation growth model to analyze the combined e®ects of skill-biased technical
change and trade on the skill premium as in Acemoglu (2002).21 However, this extension
requires that ¾s = ¾u; otherwise, there would not be a balanced growth path. We also
assume that ¯nal output can either be consumed or used in production as capital-goods.
Thus, ¯rms in the skill (labor) intensive sector use ¯nal goods and the skilled (unskilled)
labor. We assume that R&D is conducted by a ¯xed supply of scientists (e.g. Acemoglu
(2002)), and using insights from Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008), we reformulate the
product development process in a stochastic fashion similar to that in our model. We then







(" ¡ 1)(¾ ¡ 1)
(1 ¡ ¯)(" ¡ 1)(¾ ¡ 1) + (¾ ¡ ")
;
where !o and !a represent the skill premia in the open economy and the autarky, respec-
tively; and ¯ is the capital share in production.
Note that ¸ > ("¡1)="; which implies the e®ects of trade on the skill premium is stronger
under this set-up than that in the previous section (provided that ('sd='s)=('ud='u) is the
same under both cases). Second, d¸=d¯ < 0; i.e. the impact of trade on the skill premium
is magni¯ed, when the capital-goods share increases. Using " = 1:5; ¾ = 4; and ¯ = 1=3
implies that the elasticity of the skill premium with respect to the relative cuto® levels is
about 0.43 (i.e. ¸ = 0:43). The same elasticity in our basic model is about 0.33 (¼ ("¡1)=").
Hence, the e®ect of trade on the skill premium in this set-up is similar to that in our basic
model. In this extension, however, the market size e®ect will disappear due to the restriction
21The detail analysis of this extension is available from the author upon a request.22
that ¾s = ¾u:
A Appendix
A.1 Skill-Premium When Each Sector Uses Both Factors












where ®j is the labor share of skilled workers in sector j and we assume that ®s > ®u; i.e.
sector s is more skilled intensive than sector u: With this cost function, the optimal pricing





We assume that ¯rms ¯rst must make an initial investment of cjfje > 0; which is
thereafter sunk. Firms then draw their initial productivity parameter ' from a common
distribution gj(¢), which is assumed to be common for ¯rms in sector j: After entry, ¯rms
then face a constant probability ± in every period of a bad shock that would force to exit.
All of the analysis that we had in section (2) remains the same except, instead of wj; we
have cj: Thus the zero pro¯t and free-entry conditions are now given by










¹ ¼j = cjfje; (A.1)
where ~ 'j is de¯ned as in (2.13). Obviously, the above two equations yield equation (2.15),
which yields the identical cuto® level with that in section (2).
For a ¯rm with productivity '; using Shephard's lemma, the total amount of skilled











[½jrj(') + cjfj] =
®j
ws
[(¾j ¡ 1)¼j(') + ¾jcjfj]:
Similarly, the total amount of unskilled labor used in production is given by (1¡®j)[½jrj(')+
cjfj]=wu: It then follows that the total amount of skilled labor used in the production process




[(¾j ¡ 1)¹ ¼j + ¾jcjfj]; (A.2)
where ¹ ¼j represents the average pro¯t.















Combining (A.2) and (A.3) gives total amount of skilled labor used in sector j :
Ljs = ®jNj¾j [¹ ¼j + cjfj]=ws = ®jNj¹ rj=ws: (A.4)
Using this in the labor market clearing conditions, we have
wsLs = ®sNs¹ rs + ®uNu¹ ru
wuLu = (1 ¡ ®s)Ns¹ rs + (1 ¡ ®u)Nu¹ ru:
These two equations yield
Ns =
(1 ¡ ®u)wsLs ¡ ®uwuLu
[(1 ¡ ®u)®s ¡ (1 ¡ ®s)®u]¹ rs
and Nu =
®swuLu ¡ (1 ¡ ®s)wsLs
[(1 ¡ ®u)®s ¡ (1 ¡ ®s)®u]¹ ru
: (A.5)
To derive the skill-premium, we again consider equation (2.3). Multiplying both sides by






(1 ¡ ®u)wsLs ¡ ®uwuLu
®swuLu ¡ (1 ¡ ®s)wsLs
: (A.6)
We know that Pj = N
1=(1¡¾j)
j cj=½j ~ 'j and notice that equation (2.9) together with the
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where ~ °; like ° in equation (2.18), is a constant that depends on the parameters and the
exogenous variables in the model, and ! = ws=wu represents the skill-premium. Since24
¾u > ¾s > " > 1; it is easy to see that the expression in the curly bracket is an increasing
function of !: Furthermore, since ®s > ®u and ¾u > ¾s; the power of ! in the last term is
positive,22 i.e. the last term is an increasing function of !: Thus, the skill premium, !; is
an increasing function of the relative cuto® levels, 's='u:
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'sd and 'ud are domestic cuto® levels as described in section (3). If exposure to trade
increase the relative cuto® levels as in section (3), then the skill-premium in the open
economy will be higher than that in autarky. Thus, the results obtained in section (3)
qualitatively remain the same.
A.2 The Skill Premium in the Open Economy
As in the closed economy, using the free entry condition it is easy to show that Rj = wjLj:
We also know that Rj = Nj¹ rj; which then implies that Nj = wjLj=¹ rj: Using equations
(3.3) and (3.5), we obtain













By using equation (3.4), this equation can further be written as




















































where the inequality follows from our assumptions that ®s > ®u and ¾s < ¾u:25
























Inserting this into (Ps=Pu)1¡" = wsLs=wuLu and rearranging terms yields the skill premium
equation described in (3.8).
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